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Abstract— 1 In this paper, secure transmission of information
over an ergodic fading channel is studied in the presence of
statistical quality of service (QoS) constraints.We employ effective
capacity to measure the secure throughput of the system, i.e.,
effective secure throughput. We assume that the channel side
information (CSI) of the main and the eavesdropper channels
is available at the transmitter side. Under this assumption, we
investigate the optimal power control policies that maximize the
effective secure throughput. In particular, it is noted that oppor-
tunistic transmission is no longer optimal and the transmitter
should not wait to send the data at a high rate until the main
channel is much better than the eavesdropper channel. Moreover,
it is shown that the benefits of adapting the power with respect to
the CSI of both the eavesdropper and main channels rather than
the CSI of only the main channel diminish as QoS constraints
become more stringent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important consideration in wireless systems
due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In the
pioneering work [1], Wyner addressed the security problem
from an information-theoretic point of view and considered a
wire-tap channel model. He proved that secure transmission
of confidential messages to a destination in the presence of
a degraded wire-tapper can be achieved, and he established
the secrecy capacity which is defined as the highest rate of
reliable communication from the transmitter to the legitimate
receiver while keeping the wire-tapper completely ignorant of
the transmitted messages. Recently, there has been numerous
studies addressing information theoretic security. For instance,
the impact of fading has been investigated in [2], where it has
been shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can be achieved
even when the eavesdropper channel is better than the main
channel on average. The secrecy capacity region of the fading
broadcast channel with confidential messages and associated
optimal power control policies have been identified in [3],
where it is shown that the transmitter allocates more power
as the strength of the main channel increases with respect to
that of the eavesdropper channel.
In addition to security issues, providing acceptable perfor-
mance and quality is vital to many applications. For instance,
voice over IP (VoIP) and interactive-video (e.g,. videocon-
ferencing) systems are required to satisfy certain buffer or
1This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants
CNS–0834753, and CCF–0917265.
delay constraints. In this paper, we consider statistical QoS
constraints in the form of limitations on the buffer length, and
incorporate the concept of effective capacity [4], which can be
seen as the maximum constant arrival rate that a given time-
varying service process can support while satisfying statistical
QoS guarantees. The analysis and application of effective
capacity in various settings have attracted much interest re-
cently (see e.g., [5]–[7] and references therein). We define the
effective secure throughput as the maximum constant arrival
rate that can be supported while keeping the eavesdropper
ignorant of these messages in the presence of QoS constraints.
We assume that the channel side information (CSI) of the
main and eavesdropper channels is available at the transmitter
side. Under this assumption, we derive the optimal power
control policies that maximize the effective secure throughput.
We analyze two types of control policies by adapting the
power with respect to both the main and eavesdropper channel
conditions and also with respect to only the main channel
conditions. Through this analysis, we find that, due to the
introduction of the QoS constraints, the transmitter cannot
reserve its power for times at which the main channel is much
stronger than the eavesdropper channel. Also, we find that
adapting the power allocation strategy with respect to both the
main and eavesdropper channel CSI rather than only the main
channel CSI provides little improvement when QoS constraints
become more stringent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes the system model and the necessary prelim-
inaries on statistical QoS constraints and effective capacity.
In Section III, we present our results on power adaptation
policies. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
The system model is shown in Fig. 1. It is assumed that the
transmitter generates data sequences which are divided into
frames of duration T . These data frames are initially stored
in the buffer before they are transmitted over the wireless
channel. The channel input-output relationships are given by
Y1[i] = h1[i]X[i] + Z1[i] (1)
Y2[i] = h2[i]X[i] + Z2[i] (2)
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Fig. 1. The general system model.
where i is the frame index, X[i] is the channel input in the
ith frame, and Y1[i] and Y2[i] represent the channel outputs at
receivers 1 and 2 in frame i, respectively. We assume that
the sequences of fading coefficients {hj [i]} for j = 1, 2
are jointly stationary and ergodic discrete-time processes, and
we denote the magnitude-square of the fading coefficients
by zj [i] = |hj [i]|2. Considering that receiver 1 is the main
user and receiver 2 is the eavesdropper, we in the rest of
the paper express z1 and z2 as zM and zE , respectively,
for more clarity. The channel input is subject to an average
energy constraint E{|X[i]|2} ≤ P¯ /B, where B denotes the
bandwidth available in the system. Assuming that there are
B complex symbols per second, we can easily see that the
symbol energy constraint of P¯ /B implies that the channel
input has a power constraint of P¯ . Above in the channel input-
output relationships, the noise component Zj [i] is a zero-mean,
circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian random variable with
variance E{|Zj [i]|2} = Nj for j = 1, 2. The additive Gaussian
noise samples {Zj [i]} are assumed to form an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence.
We denote the average transmitted signal to noise ratio with
respect to receiver 1 as SNR = P¯N1B . We also denote P [i]
as the instantaneous transmit power in the ith frame. Now,
the instantaneous transmitted SNR level for receiver 1 can be
expressed as μ1[i] = P [i]N1B . Then, the average energy constraint
is equivalent to the average SNR constraint E{μ1[i]} ≤ SNR
for receiver 1. If we denote the ratio between the noise power
of the two channels as γ = N1N2 , the instantaneous transmitted
SNR level for receiver 2 becomes μ2[i] = γμ1[i].
B. Statistical QoS Constraints and Effective Secure Through-
put
In [4], Wu and Negi defined the effective capacity as the
maximum constant arrival rate2 that a given service process
2For time-varying arrival rates, effective capacity specifies the effective
bandwidth of the arrival process that can be supported by the channel.
can support in order to guarantee a statistical QoS requirement
specified by the QoS exponent θ. If we define Q as the
stationary queue length, then θ is the decay rate of the tail
of the distribution of the queue length Q:
lim
q→∞
logP (Q ≥ q)
q
= −θ. (3)
Therefore, for large qmax, we have the following approxima-
tion for the buffer violation probability: P (Q ≥ qmax) ≈
e−θqmax . Hence, while larger θ corresponds to more strict
QoS constraints, smaller θ implies looser QoS guarantees.
Similarly, if D denotes the steady-state delay experienced in
the buffer, then P (D ≥ dmax) ≈ e−θδdmax for large dmax,
where δ is determined by the arrival and service processes
[6].
The effective capacity is given by
C(θ) = −Λ(−θ)
θ
= − lim
t→∞
1
θt
loge E{e−θS[t]} bits/s, (4)
where the expectation is with respect to S[t] =
∑t
i=1 s[i],
which is the time-accumulated service process. {s[i], i =
1, 2, . . .} denotes the discrete-time stationary and ergodic
stochastic service process. We define the effective capacity
obtained when the service rate is confined by the secrecy
capacity as the effective secure throughput.
In this paper, in order to simplify the analysis while consid-
ering general fading distributions, we assume that the fading
coefficients stay constant over the frame duration T and vary
independently for each frame and each user. In this scenario,
s[i] = TR[i], where R[i] is the instantaneous service rate for
confidential messages in the ith frame duration [iT, (i+1)T ].
Then, (4) can be written as
C(θ) = − 1
θT
loge Ez{e−θTR[i]} bits/s, (5)
where R[i] in general depends on the fading magnitudes z =
(zM , zE). (5) is obtained using the fact that instantaneous rates
{R[i]} vary independently over different frames. The effective
secure throughput normalized by bandwidth B is
C(θ) =
C(θ)
B
bits/s/Hz. (6)
III. SECRECY CAPACITY WITH QOS CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we assume that the perfect CSI of the
main and eavesdropper channels is available at the transmitter,
and we analyze the performance in the presence of statistical
QoS constraints. In particular, we study two types of power
adaptation policies. First, we consider the case in which the
power control policies take into account the CSI of both the
main and eavesdropper channels. Subsequently, we investigate
power allocation strategies that are functions of only the CSI
of the main channel.
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A. Power Adaptation with Main and Eavesdropper Channel
State Information
In this subsection, we assume that transmitter adapts the
transmitted power according to the instantaneous values of
zM and zE only when zM > γzE . The secrecy capacity is
then given by
Rs =
⎧⎨
⎩
B log2(1 + μ(zM , zE)zM )
−B log2(1 + γμ(zM , zE)zE), zM > γzE
0, else.
(7)
where μ(zM , zE) is the optimal power allocated as a function
of zM and zE .
In the presence of QoS constraints, the optimal power
allocation policy in general depends on the QoS exponent θ3.
Hence, the secure throughput can be expressed as
CE(θ) = max
μ(θ,zM ,zE)
E{μ(θ,zM ,zE)}≤SNR
− 1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ γzE
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE
(
1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
)
(8)
where pzM (zM ) and pzE (zE) are the probability density
functions of zM and zE , respectively, and β = θTBloge 2 . Note
that the first term in the log function is a constant and
log is a monotonically increasing function. Therefore, the
maximization problem in (8) is equivalent to the following
minimization problem
min
μ(θ,zM ,zE)
E{μ(θ,zM ,zE)}≤SNR
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE
(
1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE . (9)
It is easy to check that when zM > γzE ,
f(μ) =
(
1 + μzM
1 + γμzE
)−β
(10)
is a convex function in μ. Since nonnegative weighted sum of
convex functions is convex [9], we can immediately see that
the objective function in (9) is also convex in μ. Then, we can
form the following Lagrangian function, denoted as J :
J =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE
(
1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+ λ
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE
μ(θ, zM , zE)pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE − SNR
)
(11)
Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian function over
3Due to this dependence, we henceforth use μ(θ, zM , zE) to denote the
power allocation policy under QoS constraints.
μ(θ, zM , zE), we get the following optimality condition:
∂J
∂μ(θ, zM , zE)
= λ− β
(
1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× zM − γzE
(1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM )(1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE)
= 0
(12)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier whose value is chosen to
satisfy the average power constraint with equality. For any
channel state pairs (zM , zE), μ(θ, zM , zE) can be obtained
from the above condition. Whenever the value of μ(θ, zM , zE)
is negative, it follows from the convexity of the objective
function with respect to μ(θ, zM , zE) that the optimal value
of μ(θ, zM , zE) is 0.
There is no closed-form solution to (12). However, since
the right-hand side (RHS) of (12) is a monotonically increas-
ing function, numerical techniques such as bisection search
method can be efficiently adopted to derive the solution.
The secure throughput can be determined by substituting the
optimal power control policy μ∗(θ, zM , zE) in (8). Exploiting
the optimality condition in (12), we can notice that when
μ(θ, zM , zE) = 0, we have zM − γzE = λβ . Meanwhile,(
1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× 1
(1 + μ(θ, zM , zE)zM )(1 + γμ(θ, zM , zE)zE)
< 1. (13)
Thus, we must have zM − γzE > λβ for μ(θ, zM , zE) > 0,
i.e., μ(θ, zM , zE) = 0 if zM −γzE ≤ λβ . Hence, we can write
the secure throughput as
CE(θ) = − 1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ γzE+ λβ
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE+
λ
β
(
1 + μ∗(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γμ∗(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
)
(14)
where μ∗(θ, zM , zE) is the derived optimal power control
policy.
B. Power Adaptation with only Main Channel State Informa-
tion
In this section, we assume that the transmitter adapts the
power level by only taking into account the CSI of the main
channel (the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver). Under this assumption, the secrecy rate for a specific
channel state pair becomes
Rs = [B log2(1 + μ(zM )zM )−B log2(1 + γμ(zM )zE)]+
(15)
where μ(zM ) is the optimal power allocated as a function of
only zM .
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Fig. 2. The effective secure throughput vs. θ in the Rayleigh fading channel
with E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
In this case, the secure throughput can be expressed as
CE(θ) = max
μ(θ,zM )
E{μ(θ,zM )}≤SNR
− 1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zM /γ
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ zM /γ
0
(
1 + μ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
)
.
(16)
Similar to the discussion in Section III-A, we get the following
equivalent minimization problem:
min
μ(θ,zM )
E{μ(θ,zM )}≤SNR
∫ ∞
0
∫ zM/γ
0
(
1 + μ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM .
(17)
The objective function in this case is again convex, and with
a similar Lagrangian optimization method, we can get the
following optimality condition:
∂J
∂μ(θ, zM )
= −β
∫ zM/γ
0
(
1 + μ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE
)−β−1
× zM − γzE
(1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE)2
pzE (zE)dzE + λ = 0
(18)
where λ is a constant chosen to satisfy the average power
constraint with equality. If the obtained power level μ(θ, zM )
is negative, then the optimal value of μ(θ, zM ) becomes 0
according to the convexity of the objective function in (17).
The RHS of (18) is still a monotonic increasing function of
μ(θ, zM ).
The secure throughput can be determined by substituting the
optimal power control policy μ∗(θ, zM ) in (16). Exploiting
the optimality condition in (18), we can notice that when
μ(θ, zM , zE) = 0, we have
−β
∫ zM/γ
0
(zM − γzE)pzE (zE)dzE + λ = 0 (19)
⇒
∫ zM
0
P (zE ≤ t/γ)dt = λ
β
(20)
Let us denote the solution to the above equation as α.
Considering that(
1 + μ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE
)−β−1 1
(1 + γμ(θ, zM )zE)2
< 1, (21)
we must have zM > α for μ(θ, zM ) > 0, i.e., μ(θ, zM ) = 0
if zM ≤ α. Hence, we can write the secure throughput as
CE(θ) = − 1
θTB
loge
(∫ α
0
∫ ∞
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
α
∫ ∞
zM/γ
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
α
∫ zM/γ
0
(
1 + μ∗(θ, zM )zM
1 + γμ∗(θ, zM )zE
)−β
(22)
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
)
(23)
where μ∗(θ, zM ) is the derived optimal power control policy.
C. Numerical Results
In Fig. 2, we plot the effective secure throughput as a
function of the QoS exponent θ in Rayleigh fading channel
with γ = 1 when the power is adapted with respect to the full
CSI (i.e., the CSI of main and eavesdropper channels) and
also with respect to only the main CSI. It can be seen from
the figure that as the QoS constraints become more stringent
and hence as the value of θ increases, little improvement is
provided by considering the CSI of the eavesdropper channel
in the power adaptation. In Fig. 3, we plot the effective secure
throughput as SNR varies for θ = {0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}. Not
surprisingly, we again observe that taking into account the
CSI of the eavesdropper channel in the power adaptation
policy does not provide much gains in terms of increasing
the effective secure throughput in the large SNR regime. Also,
as QoS constraints become more strict, we similarly note that
adapting the power with full CSI does not increase the rate of
secure transmission much even at medium SNR levels.
To characterize the power allocation strategy, we plot the
power distribution as a function of (zE , zM ) for the full CSI
case when θ = 0.01 and θ = 0 in Fig. 4. In the figure, we see
that for both values of θ, no power is allocated for transmission
when zM < zE which is expected under the assumption
of equal noise powers, i.e., N1 = N2. We note that when
θ = 0 and hence there are no buffer constraints, opportunistic
transmission policy is employed. More power is allocated for
cases in which the difference zM − zE is large. Therefore,
the transmitter favors the times at which the main channel is
much better than the eavesdropper channel. At these times,
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Fig. 3. The effective secure throughput vs. SNR in the Rayleigh fading
channel with E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
Fig. 4. The power allocation for the full CSI scenario with SNR = 0 dB in
the Rayleigh fading channel with E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
the transmitter sends the information at a high rate with large
power. When zM−zE is small, transmission occurs at a small
rate with small power. However, this strategy is clearly not
optimal in the presence of buffer constraints because waiting
to transmit at a high rate until the main channel becomes much
stronger than the eavesdropper channel can lead to buildup in
the buffer and incur large delays. Hence, we do not observe
this opportunistic transmission strategy when θ = 0.01. In
this case, we note that a more uniform power allocation is
preferred. In order not to violate the limitations on the buffer
length, transmission at a moderate power level is performed
even when zM − zE is small.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the secrecy capacity in the
presence of statistical QoS constraints. We have considered
the effective secure throughput as a measure of the perfor-
mance. With different assumptions on the use of the main
and eavesdropper CSI in the power control strategies, we have
investigated the associated optimal power allocation policies
that maximize the effective secure throughput. In particular, we
have noted that the transmitter allocates power more uniformly
instead of concentrating its power for the cases in which
the main channel is much stronger than the eavesdropper
channel. By numerically comparing the obtained effective
secure throughput, we have shown that as QoS constraints
become more stringent, the benefits of incorporating the CSI of
the eavesdropper channel in the power control policy diminish.
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